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Constitutional Limits to the Political Choice for Mixity
Merijn Chamon*
Introduction
Given that mixity is one of the most characteristic features of the Euro-
pean Union’s external action,1 it is fitting to explore part of the constitu-
tional framework that governs and structures the phenomenon in this vol-
ume. All the more so because mixity is mired in controversy, generally re-
ceiving a bad press from EU external relations scholars. As Weiler, him-
self more sympathetic to mixity, already noted in 1983 “it has been quite
common to […] regard mixed agreements as an obstacle and impediment
to the process of European integration and thus to condemn them or at best
to tolerate them as a necessary evil”.2 In constitutional terms, the phe-
nomenon of mixity finds its origin in the specific allocation of compe-
tences in the EU legal order as informed by the principle of conferred
powers. From the 1990s onwards and to ensure the manageability of mixi-
ty in practice, the Court of Justice has added the constitutional principle of
sincere cooperation to the equation, identifying a duty of cooperation be-
tween the Member States and the EU institutions to ensure unity in the ex-
ternal representation of the Union and the Member States.3 The shift in ju-
I.
* I would like to thank Gesa Kübek for remarks on an earlier draft. All errors or
omissions remain mine.
1 Kadelbach and Eekhout note that the majority of the EU’s agreements are mixed,
while Cremona refers to the majority of important agreements. See S. Kadelbach,
“Handlungsformen und Steuerungsressourcen in den EU-Außenbeziehungen”, in A.
Hatje, P.-C. Müller-Graf (eds), Europäische Außenbeziehungen (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2014), 227; P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011), 212; M. Cremona, “EU External Relations: Unity and Confer-
ral of Powers”, in L. Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the European
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 78.
2 J. Weiler, “The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the
Federal Principle”, in D. O'Keeffe, H. Schermers (eds), Mixed Agreements (Deven-
ter: Kluwer, 1983), 37.
3 C. Hillion, “'Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations: The Significance of
the 'Duty of Cooperation'”, in C. Hillion, P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Re-
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risprudential focus, henceforth emphasising pragmatic solutions on the ex-
ercise of shared or concurrent EU and Member States’ competences has
been criticised as pushing out the more fundamental question regarding
the existence of (EU) competence.4 Although law scholars should not fool
themselves into believing they hold any sway over the judges at the Court,
it is interesting to note that the Court in a more recent case seems to have
returned to the question of competence, this time through the principle of
the autonomy of the EU legal order. The still developing framework gov-
erning (and restricting) mixity is then composed of the principles of con-
ferral, loyalty and autonomy, with the precise rules flowing from these
principles still to be determined.
Mixity’s Constitutional Foundations
The European Union has been described as an open federation in light of
the fact that both the Union and its constituent entities may engage, inde-
pendently from each other, in international relations.5 The open character
of the EU’s federative Union thereby stands in stark contrast to the (more
typical) statal federations where the federal principle is thrown overboard
in external legal relations and the state acts as a unitary actor in relation to
the outside world, as if it were not a federation at all.6 While the choice for
an open federation is laudable in light of federalism’s value of diversity, it
evidently comes at a price of greater complexity (and the risk of under-
mining unity). An additional complicating factor for the EU is that the EU
Treaties have conferred shared competences on the EU. As a result, the
open EU federation requires constitutional mechanisms in order to deter-
mine, in specific cases, which level of government is to act externally and
to what extent. Supervening exclusivity, codified by the Lisbon Treaty in
Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), is one such mechanism originally worked out by the Court
II.
visited: the EU and its Member States in the World (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2010), 87-88.
4 M. Cremona, supra note 1, 74.
5 R. Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 173.
6 J. Weiler, supra note 2, 37-38.
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of Justice.7 Mixity is another, and was developed by the institutions and
the Member States. While it has not been enshrined in EU primary law,8
the Court has explicitly sanctioned the practice in its established case law.9
Thus, the phenomenon of mixity, that is of agreements concluded by
EU and all, or some, Member States with another entity (state or interna-
tional organization) under international law,10 is typically explained by
two legal considerations, which in turn are informed by the EU’s principle
of conferred powers.11 First, mixity is a consequence of the limited scope
of the EU’s competences: when an international agreement which the EU
would like to conclude deals with matters not wholly coming within the
competences conferred on the EU, the involvement of the EU Member
States in the agreement is legally required. Second, even if the matters
dealt with in the international agreement do come under the EU’s compe-
tences, the involvement of the EU Member States is only legally preclud-
ed if every single matter comes under the EU’s exclusive competences.12
If not, the EU may exercise some of its shared competences, in respect of
7 Supervening exclusivity ruling out a role of the Member States (despite the EU be-
ing an open federation) explains why Weiler praised the federalist merits of mixity.
8 Only the Euratom Treaty explicitly foresees mixity in Article 102. The Treaty of
Nice added a reference to mixed agreements in Article 133, paragraph 6, EC but
this was taken out of the Treaties again by the Lisbon Treaty. The latter then only
hints at mixity for the conclusion of the EU’s accession to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (in Article 218, paragraph 8, TFEU).
9 See i.a. Opinion of the Court of 26 April 1977, 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing
a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, EU:C:1977:63, para 7;
Opinion of the Court of 19 March 1993, 2/91, Convention no. 170 of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work,
EU:C:1993:106, paras 36-39; Judgment of 2 March 1994, Parliament v Council,
C-316/91, EU:C:1994:76, para 26.
10 S. Kadelbach, supra note 1, 227.
11 See also P. Eeckhout, supra note 1, 213-214.
12 Until the recent judgment of the Court in Germany v Council (see infra note 15)
some Member States typically assumed that mixity is required whenever an agree-
ment is not fully covered by EU exclusive competences. See also infra note 76.
Still, this point of view was not limited to the Member States. Pre-Lisbon Neframi
also remarks that agreements coming under shared EU competences cannot be
concluded by the EU alone if the ERTA and Opinion 1/76 doctrines do not apply.
See E. Neframi, Les accords mixtes de la Communauté européenne : aspects com-
munautaires et internationaux (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007), 107-111. See also G.
Garzón Clariana, “La mixité: le droit et les problèmes pratiques”, in J. Bourgeois
(ed), La Communauté européenne et les accords mixtes (Maastricht: Presses in-
teruniversitaires européennes, 1997), 16. In addition, the Court sowed some confu-
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which Article 2, paragraph 2, TFEU provides: “Member States shall exer-
cise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its
competence”. Thus, as long as the EU refrains from exercising such
shared competences, a question which is ultimately in the hands of the EU
Council, there is scope for Member State action and, hence, mixity.
Constraining Compulsory Mixity
It follows from the above that a distinction should at least be made be-
tween compulsory and facultative mixity.13 Although the Court created
some confusion on facultative mixity in Opinion 2/15 by finding that the
EU could not conclude the Singapore Free Trade Agreement (EUSFTA)
on its own given that some of its provisions came under the EU’s shared
competences,14 it set the record straight in Germany v Council where Ger-
many argued that the EU only has an external competence if it is exclu-
sive.15 The Court firmly rejected this suggestion,16 and clarified its finding
in Opinion 2/15 by noting that in that case it had taken into account the
political context and had assumed that the required majority would not be
III.
sion on this in its Opinion on the Singapore FTA but afterwards corrected itself in
Germany v Council.
13 Different typologies of mixity have been proposed in the past. See H. Schermers,
“A Typology of Mixed Agreements”, in D. O'Keeffe, H. Schermers (eds), Mixed
Agreements, supra note 2, 23-33; A. Rosas, “The European Union and Mixed
Agreements”, in A. Dashwood, C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External
Relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 203-207; M. Maresceau, “A Typol-
ogy of Mixed Bilateral Agreements”, in C. Hillion, P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed
Agreements Revisited, supra note 3, 11-29. The added value of these typologies
has also been questioned, see P. Eeckhout, supra note 1, 213-214.
14 The Court found that some aspects of the FTA came under shared (rather than ex-
clusive) EU competence and hence the agreement could not be concluded by the
EU alone. See Opinion of 16 May 2017, 2/15, EU- Singapore Free Trade Agree-
ment, EU:C:2017:376, paras 243-244, 282. This would imply that facultative mixi-
ty does not exist and that instead the EU can only conclude compulsory EU-only
agreements (pursuant to exclusive EU competences) or compulsory mixed agree-
ments.
15 See Judgment of 5 December 2017, Germany v Council, C-600/14,
EU:C:2017:935, para 38.
16 Id., paras 47-51.
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found in the Council for the EU to exercise its shared competences on its
own.17
In light of Weiler’s statement, facultative mixity is often seen as an ob-
stacle to European integration, while compulsory mixity is seen as a nec-
essary evil. Going beyond mere value judgements, this contribution aims
to address the question whether the constitutional principles identified ear-
lier may in some way structure or limit the institutions’ and Member
States’ choice for mixity in EU external action.
At first sight, there can only be a genuine choice for mixity in the case
of facultative mixity. On the other hand, when part of an agreement relates
to an exclusive national competence, mixity would seem inevitable (i.e.
compulsory). This traditional view is captured by the “pastis metaphor”18
which Advocate General Kokott in the Vietnam WTO Accession case pre-
sented in the following way: “Individual aspects of an agreement for
which the Community has no competence internally ‘infect’ the agreement
as a whole and make it dependent on the common accord of the Member
States. […] Just as a little drop of pastis can turn a glass of water milky,
individual provisions, however secondary, in an international agreement
based on the first subparagraph of Article 133(5) EC can make it neces-
sary to conclude a shared agreement”.19 Such mixity, even if it is compul-
sory, may then in fact be a type of hidden facultative mixity, since Mem-
ber States in the past have often insisted on the inclusion of such unneces-
sary “secondary” provisions to ensure that an envisaged agreement must
(legally) be concluded as a mixed agreement.20
17 Id., para 68.
18 The pastis metaphor had earlier been coined by then Trade Commissioner Pascal
Lamy in a slightly different context. Arguing for a generalization of qualified ma-
jority voting in EU Trade Policy during the Convention on the future of Europe, he
noted: “The Treaty of Nice has been a step in the right direction, but too many
pockets of unanimity survive. And under the Pastis principle, a little drop of unan-
imity can taint the entire glass of QMV water”. See P. Lamy, The Convention and
Trade Policy: Concrete Steps to Enhance the EU’s International Profile, Speech,
Brussels, 5 February 2002, p. 3.
19 Opinion of AG Kokott of 26 March 2009, Commission v Council, C-13/07,
EU:C:2009:190, para 121.
20 The example of provisions on political dialogue is often cited in this regard. G.
Garzón Clariana, supra note 12, 22. See G. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of
EU External Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 235-236. Post-
Lisbon, clauses on political dialogue may be covered by the Common Foreign and
Security Policy and do not require mixity anymore. Commenting on AG Sharp-
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This traditional view should be juxtaposed with the view that would ap-
ply the absorption doctrine to provisions of an ancillary nature. Typically
the absorption doctrine is applied horizontally when the EU institutions
have to identify the legal basis for EU action. Pursuant to the established
case law of the Court of Justice,21 the choice of legal basis is not left to the
discretion of the legislature but must be based on objective factors, no-
tably the aim and the content of the measure to be adopted. If a measure
pursues different aims, one of which is the main objective while the other
is merely ancillary, the main objective ‘absorbs’ the ancillary objective
and the measure should be adopted solely pursuant to the legal basis corre-
sponding to the main objective.22
Can the absorption doctrine also be applied vertically to the effect that
ancillary provisions which happen to come under (exclusive) national
competences are absorbed by the provisions coming under EU compe-
tence? Recently, Advocate General Wahl seemed to suggest so in his
Opinion on the Marrakesh Treaty when he observed, albeit in passing, that
“a mixed agreement would be required, generally, where an international
agreement concerns coexistent competences: that is, it includes a part
which falls under the exclusive competence of the Union and a part which
falls under the exclusive competence of the Member States, without any of
those parts being ancillary to the other”.23
In support of his (implied) assertion that compulsory mixity might be
avoided by applying the absorption doctrine, Advocate General Wahl re-
lied on Opinion 1/94 and Portugal v Council. In Opinion 1/94, the Com-
ston’s Opinion in 2/15 in which the termination of Member States’ existing invest-
ment Treaties was qualified as an exclusive national competence, Kleimann
opined that such clauses are redundant in the EU’s new generation free trade
agreements. Under this reasoning, their inclusion would also result in false mixity.
See D. Kleimann, “Reading Opinion 2/15 : Standards of Analysis, the Court’s Dis-
cretion, and the Legal View of the Advocate General”, EUI Working Papers, no.
23 (2017), 22.
21 See inter alia the case law cited in Opinion of 6 December 2001, 2/00, Cartagena
Protocol, EU:C:2001:664, para 23.
22 See A. De Walsche, “La procédure de conclusion des accords internationaux”, in
J-V. Louis, M. Dony (eds), Relations Extérieures (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Univer-
sité de Bruxelles, 2005), 81-82; M. Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded
by the European Community (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 156-157.
23 Opinion of AG Wahl of 8 September 2016, Opinion 3/15, EU:C:2016:657, para
122. In the Council, several Member States had noted that the absorption doctrine
could not be applied vertically. See Council doc. 8305/14 ADD 1, p. 3.
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mission had argued that the TRIPS agreement (provisions harmonising in-
tellectual property protection) could be brought under the trade notion of
Article 113 EEC since earlier agreements concluded pursuant to Arti-
cle 113 EEC contained provisions on intellectual property. 24 The Court
dismissed this, noting that those provisions in earlier agreements were
“extremely limited in scope”, while confirming that “the Community and
its institutions are entitled to incorporate within external agreements other-
wise falling within the ambit of Article 113 ancillary provisions for the or-
ganization of purely consultative procedures or clauses calling on the oth-
er party to raise the level of protection of intellectual property”.25
A clearer application of the absorption doctrine could be found in Por-
tugal v Council, where Portugal questioned the legal basis used to con-
clude a cooperation agreement with India. Relying on Opinion 1/94, Por-
tugal argued that the legal bases related to trade policy and development
policy could not be used to include a general provision on intellectual
property protection in the agreement.26 In this regard, the Court noted that
the obligations assumed were very limited. The commitment to facilitate
24 Specifically, the EEC-USSR agreement on trade in textile products provided in
Article 20: “As regards intellectual property, at the request of either Contracting
Party, consultations shall be held […] with a view to finding an equitable solution
to problems relating to the protection of marks, designs or models of articles of
apparel and textile products”. The interim agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary provided (in Articles 37, 36 and 35) that those countries “shall
continue to improve the protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial prop-
erty rights in order to provide […] a level of protection similar to that provided in
the Community […], including comparable means of enforcing such rights”. See
the EEC-USSR agreement, OJ 1989 L 391/2; EEC-Bulgaria agreement, OJ 1993 L
323/2; EEC-Czechoslovakia agreement, OJ 1992 L 115/2; EEC-Hungary agree-
ment, OJ 1992 L 116/2.
25 Opinion of 15 November 1994, 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude
International Agreements Concerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual
Property, EU:C:1994:384, paras 67-68.
26 The specific provision in casu was Article 10 of the Agreement, which provided
that: “The Contracting Parties undertake to ensure as far as their laws, regulations
and policies allow that suitable and effective protection is provided for intellectual
property rights, including patents, trade or service marks, copyright and similar
rights, geographical designations (including marks of origin), industrial designs
and integrated circuit topographies, reinforcing this protection where desirable.
They also undertake, wherever possible, to facilitate access to the data bases of in-
tellectual property organizations”. See EEC-India Cooperation Agreement, OJ
1994 L 223, p. 24.
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access to databases for instance “ha[d] only a very limited scope and [was]
ancillary in nature”.27 The Court therefore concluded that the scope of the
resulting obligations was not as such to constitute objectives different
from the general objective of development cooperation.28 While the Court
thereby undeniably applied the absorption doctrine it must be noted that,
differently from what Advocate General Wahl seemed to imply, there was
no exclusive national competence at issue. Instead, Portugal had argued
that the EU did not have an exclusive competence pursuant to Articles 113
and 130y EEC 29 while the Council rightly noted that the lack of an exclu-
sive EU competence did not mean that the EU lacked competence to con-
clude the agreement on its own.30
In addition to the cases mentioned by Advocate General Wahl, Rosas
has referred to Opinion 1/78 to argue that “the provisions relating to possi-
ble ‘coexistent’ Member States competences may be of such a limited rel-
evance that they should be seen as ‘ancillary’ (subsidiary) to the essential
objectives of the agreement. If this is the case, Member States participa-
tion would not be necessary – or, in cases of exclusive Community com-
petence, even legally admissible”.31 Indeed, in Opinion 1/78, the Court
confirmed that the conclusion of the agreement on natural rubber came
within the EU’s exclusive competences on trade depending on how the
27 Judgment of 3 December 1996, Portugal v Council, C-268/94, EU:C:1996:461,
para 75.
28 Id., para 76.
29 See id., para 69. This illustrates the typical (political) reasoning followed by the
Member States to date: if an agreement does not wholly come under EU exclusive
competences, mixity is presented as an automatic consequence. As Heliskoski
notes, this is plainly erroneous even if AG Pergola seemed to concur with Portugal
when he noted that when “the Community does not enjoy exclusive competence
…, matters have to be regulated by means of mixed agreements”. See Opinion of
AG Pergola of 23 May 1996, Portugal v Council, C-268/94, EU:C:1996:207,
para 41; J. Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the Inter-
national Relations of the European Community and its Member States (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 42.
30 Note however that the Council only half-heartedly defended the possibility of the
EU exercising shared competences on its own: “[The Council] considers that the
Community had the power to conclude the Agreement without the participation of
the Member States since the clause in the Agreement concerning intellectual prop-
erty has only limited scope and involves substantial obligations only on the part of
India”. See Judgment of 3 December 1996, Portugal v Council, C-268/94,
EU:C:1996:461, para 71.
31 A. Rosas, supra note 13, 204.
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mechanism set up by the agreement would be financed (by EU or Member
States’ funds). The Court took care to point out that from a substantive
point of view the agreement in any case was covered by the current Article
207 TFEU. Other provisions in the agreement such as those on technologi-
cal assistance and labour conditions on the other hand could not “modify
the description of the agreement which must be assessed having regard to
its essential objective rather than in terms of individual clauses of an alto-
gether subsidiary or ancillary nature”.32 According to Rosas, if such ancil-
lary provisions nonetheless trigger mixity, one can speak, especially if ex-
clusive EU competences are at issue, of false mixity.33
The views of Advocate General Wahl seem difficult to square with
those of Advocate General Kokott but it should be noted that Advocate
General Kokott used her pastis metaphor when interpreting the very com-
plex amendments made by the Nice Treaty to Article 133 EC and especial-
ly the relationship between the fifth and sixth paragraph of that Article.
According to the Advocate General, “Article 133(6) EC is not an excep-
tion to the first subparagraph of Article 133(5) EC and, as such, to be in-
terpreted narrowly …. At the same time, [Article 133(6) EC] counteracts a
main-purpose test operating to the disadvantage of the areas of compe-
tence of the Member States”. 34 Thus, despite having worded her pastis
metaphor in general terms, Advocate General Kokott did not as such rule
out a main-purpose test (and the resulting absorption doctrine) when de-
ciding on the vertical delimitation of competences (rather than the hori-
zontal cases in which it is typically applied).
To sum up, while the above case law tends to support applying the ab-
sorption doctrine in order to avoid a situation of facultative mixity, two
key points must be addressed before transposing this finding to instances
of compulsory mixity. First, apart from Portugal v Council, these cases in-
volved the common trade policy, an a priori exclusive competence of the
32 Opinion of 4 October 1979, 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber,
EU:C:1979:224, para 56.
33 A. Rosas, supra note 13, p. 205. See also J. Heliskoski, supra note 29, 68. Simi-
larly Gilsdorf criticized the Member States’ insistence on mixed agreements when
certain provisions are not covered by EU competence, ignoring the often ancillary
nature of these provisions. See P. Gilsdorf, “Die Außenkompetenzen der EG im
Wandel – Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Praxis und Rechtsprechung”, Eu-
roparecht 31, no. 2 (1996), 161.
34 Opinion of AG Kokott of 26 March 2009, Commission v Council, C-13/07,
EU:C:2009:190, para 120.
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EU.35 Second, none of the cases actually involved the absorption of provi-
sions coming under exclusive national competence.
In addition, the correct application of the absorption doctrine in general
remains rather murky, as was further illustrated in the Opinion procedure
on EUSFTA.36 Advocate General Sharpston found that the Investor State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism’s function was to make the en-
forcement of the EUSFTA more effective and opined that in line with the
Court’s case law,37 “dispute settlement and mediation mechanisms are an-
cillary in nature, the allocation of competences between the European
Union and the Member States for such mechanisms is necessarily the
same as for the substantive provisions to which they relate. In other words,
those mechanisms are not in themselves capable of altering the allocation
of competences between the European Union and its Member States”.38
The Court on the other hand noted that the specific arrangement for ISDS
in the EUSFTA was worked out in such a way that disputes brought for
arbitration are removed from the jurisdiction of the national courts. Such a
regime then “cannot be of a purely ancillary nature […] and cannot, there-
fore, be established without the Member States’ consent”.39 The Advocate
General and the Court clearly disagreed on this point but the Court, unfor-
tunately, is not particularly forthcoming on the precise reason why the
mechanism’s repercussions were too significant to be qualified as ancil-
lary.40 In addition, lack of EU competence resulting from the non-ancillary
nature of the mechanism seems a non sequitur: if the provisions on ISDS
35 This is why Kaniel refers to cases such as Opinion 1/78 as cases involving an ‘an-
cillary exclusive power’. See M. Kaniel, The Exclusive Treaty-Making Power of
the European Community up to the Period of the Single European Act (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1996), 55-57.
36 In this regard, Kleimann has argued that for the purpose of determining the pre-
dominant and ancillary provisions of an act the Court should, as a matter of sys-
temic coherence, apply the same ‘objective factors amenable to judicial review’
which it applies for determining an act’s legal basis. See D. Kleimann, supra note
20, 12.
37 See Opinion of 16 May 2017, 2/15, supra note 14, para 276.
38 Opinion of AG Sharpston of 21 December 2016, Opinion 2/15, EU:C:2016:992,
para 529.
39 Opinion of 16 May 2017, 2/15, supra note 14, para 292.
40 It may be noted that the Court did not explicitly find that the mechanism touches
on an exclusive national competence. Thus, even if it noted that it would not deal
with the FTA’s compatibility with the Treaties (see para 30) the Court may also
have felt that the mechanism could not be qualified as ancillary because of its
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were too significant to be absorbed by the provisions on trade and trans-
port the question should have become whether there might still be EU
competence pursuant to another legal basis in the Treaties.
Facultative Mixity and its Critique
Leaving the area of compulsory mixity behind and focusing on the EU’s
shared competences brings us to a second and perhaps more pressing is-
sue. In cases of shared competence (or generally when an agreement is not
completely covered by Article 3 TFEU), the EU institutions may opt not
to make use of the EU’s competences, leaving the legal space open for the
Member States to be involved in the process.41 The situation in which a
potential EU-only agreement is turned into a mixed agreement may be de-
scribed as typical facultative mixity.42
Given that mixity is perceived as hampering the effectiveness of EU ex-
ternal action,43 the question arises of why the Member States would insist
on being involved in the conclusion of such agreements in their own ca-
pacity as subjects of international law. This question has been well docu-
mented, 44 although nothing radically new has been added to the insights
formulated in this regard by Ehlermann in 1983.45 Today, the most impor-
tant reason for the Member States’ insistence on mixity, when it is not
legally required, is, allegedly, their wish to remain ‘visible’ on the interna-
tional stage.46
IV.
repercussions on the preliminary ruling procedure, even if the FTA itself rules out
the direct effect of its provisions.
41 See J. Heliskoski, supra note 29, 25.
42 See A. Rosas, supra note 13, 205-206. Klamert rightly remarks that facultative
mixity is also at issue when a mixed agreement covers exclusive Member State
and shared (EU and Member State) competences. See M. Klamert, The Principle
of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 183-184. How-
ever, such facultative mixity will not be discussed in the present contribution.
43 C. Hillion, supra note 3, 90.
44 A. Dashwood, “Why Continue to Have Mixed Agreements at All?”, in J. Bour-
geois (ed), La Communauté européenne et les accords mixtes, supra note 12,
96-97.
45 C-D. Ehlermann, “Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems”, in David O'Keeffe &
Henri Schermers (eds), Mixed agreements, supra note 2, 4-9.
46 R. Schütze, supra note 5, 203.
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Recourse to mixity, both in cases of compulsory and facultative mixity,
has been criticised in legal doctrine. Schütze for instance argues that it
ought to be avoided and laments that the Court of Justice has given its ju-
dicial blessing to an uncontrolled resort to mixity.47 Even an ardent sup-
porter like Dashwood has conceded that the ‘inconveniences’ that are
sometimes caused by mixed agreements should be minimised.48 In this re-
gard, he has proposed that where practicable, mixity should be avoided by
excising dispensable elements from the agreement if these elements would
trigger (compulsory) mixity and the Commission should convince the
Member States (in areas of shared competence) that they do not lose any-
thing by agreeing to conclude EU-only agreements.49 Here Dashwood
sees a role for the Commission in alleviating the Member States’ fears of a
“reverse ERTA” doctrine. Under this doctrine, the exercise by the EU of
external competences would pre-empt Member States’ acting in the field
internally, rendering the competence an exclusive EU competence (thus
reversing ERTA, where the exercise by the EU of an internal competence
can result in the pre-emption of Member States acting externally).50 How-
ever, even if the Commission would argue against a reverse ERTA doc-
trine,51 it should be noted that this issue is not really in the hands of the
Commission in the first place. This may explain why the Member States
47 Id., 204-205 (see especially footnote 140).
48 A. Dashwood, supra note 44, 93.
49 Id., 97. Dashwood further proposed to introduce certain rules in primary law gov-
erning mixed agreements. It is open for debate however whether a Treaty change
would be legally required. While this would seem to be the case for Dashwood’s
proposal allowing the Council to unanimously adopt common positions in areas of
exclusive Member States competence, it must be noted the Court in the FAO case
implicitly accepted that the Council could represent and bind the Member States in
their individual capacity. See P. Eeckhout, supra note 1, 246; C. Timmermans,
“Organising Joint Participation of EC and Member States”, in A. Dashwood, C.
Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations, supra note 13, 243-244.
50 M. Cremona, supra note 1, 70.
51 In its observations in Opinion 2/92, the Commission rejected a reversal of the ER-
TA doctrine but not a reversed ERTA doctrine when it noted: “the fact that the
Member States retain certain internal powers cannot necessarily be relied upon for
the purpose of conferring external powers on them”. See Opinion of 24 March
1995, 2/92, Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to participate
in the Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment, EU:C:1995:83.
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introduced Article 207, paragraph 6, TFEU through the Lisbon Treaty.52
As Klamert notes, the Court itself has never ruled on whether an interna-
tional agreement, concluded under shared EU competence, might consti-
tute a ‘common rule’ in itself under the ERTA doctrine,53 a question which
would precede the question on whether there might be a reverse ERTA
doctrine.
In contrast to Dashwood, Eeckhout argues that, given all the disadvan-
tages associated with mixity, it is best avoided.54 Eeckhout also foresees a
role for the Court, arguing that “the requirement of the unity in the inter-
national representation of the EU demands pure EU agreements” in cases
where the agreement is wholly covered by (non-exclusive) EU compe-
tences.55 Eeckhout does not further develop this argument himself, but it
would arguably require the Court to take a qualitative step via its case law.
As noted above, the Court, reasoning from the constitutional principle of
sincere cooperation, has developed a duty of cooperation between Mem-
ber States and the EU based on “unity in the international representation
of the EU” in order to “attenuate the plurality inherent to mixity”.56 Pur-
suant to this case law, unity in the international representation of the EU
imposes a number of obligations on the Member States so as to make mix-
ity manageable. Eeckhout’s suggestion should then be seen as rather radi-
cal since the requirement of unity would be used to preclude any recourse
to mixity instead of simply managing it.
Timmermans, also critical of mixity, has observed that the focus should
be on the question “whether Community competence exists and what are
the advantages of exercising it? If these advantages are obvious, Member
52 Article 207, paragraph 6, TFEU provides: “The exercise of the competences con-
ferred by this Article in the field of the common commercial policy shall not affect
the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, and
shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Mem-
ber States in so far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation”. On the different
ways to interpret Article 207, paragraph 6, TFEU, see J.A. Bischoff, “Just a Little
Bit of "Mixity"? The EU's Role in the Field of International Investment Protection
Law”, Common Market Law Review 48, no. 6 (2011), 1541-1543.
53 M. Klamert, supra note 42, 186.
54 P. Eeckhout, supra note 1, 264-265.
55 Id., 265.
56 C. Hillion, supra note 3, 90.
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States should act through the Community”.57 Expounding on this, he notes
that mixed agreements in areas coming under the EU’s parallel compe-
tences (see Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 4, TFEU) do not seem objection-
able while a free choice for mixity in areas coming under shared compe-
tences (Article 4, paragraph 2, TFEU) does.58 A rather cynical example
(and probably not on Timmermans’ mind at the time) of a practical advan-
tage to EU-only agreements may be found in the Association Agreement
between the EU and Kosovo. Normally, the Stabilization and Association
Agreements (SAAs) concluded between the EU and the ex-Yugoslav
countries take the form of mixed agreements.59 The SAA with Kosovo60
however has been concluded as an EU-only agreement following a request
from the five EU Member States that do not recognise Kosovo’s indepen-
dence.61 The ‘advantage’ for these Member States of concluding an EU-
only agreement is clear but the Council decision concluding the agreement
makes it equally clear that this in no way changes the Member States’ gen-
eral approach of insisting on mixity.62 Still, the other practical advantage
57 C. Timmermans, “Organising Joint Participation of EC and Member States”, in A.
Dashwood, C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations, supra
note 13, 247.
58 C. Timmermans, “The Court of Justice and Mixed Agreements”, in The Court of
Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years
of Caselaw (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2013), 663.
59 See e.g. the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia and
Herzegovina, OJ 2015 L 164, p. 2; SAA with the Republic of Serbia, OJ 2013
L 278, p. 16; SAA with the Republic of Montenegro, OJ 2010 L 108, p. 3.
60 SAA with Kosovo, OJ 2016 L 71, p. 3. Discussing this SAA and its EU-only na-
ture, see P. Van Elsuwege, “Legal Creativity in EU External Relations: The Stabil-
isation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo”, European For-
eign Affairs Review 22, no. 3 (2017), 393-409.
61 The report of the UK House of Commons committee on European Scrutiny reveals
that the other Member States (or at least the UK) agreed to this request on the con-
dition that the unique nature of the agreement would be stressed so as to not set a
precedent for future agreements. See point 27.22 of the Documents considered by
the Committee on 21 July 2015.
62 Recital 5 of the Decision’s preamble provides: “This is an EU-only agreement.
The commitments and cooperation to be entered into by the Union under this
Agreement relate only to the areas covered by the EU acquis or existing Union
policies. The signing and conclusion of this Agreement as an EU-only Agreement
is without prejudice to the nature and scope of any similar agreements to be nego-
tiated in the future. It is also without prejudice to the powers of the EU institutions
conferred on them in the Treaties and the positions of EU institutions and Member
States on competences”. See Council Decision 2016/342, OJ 2016 L 71, p. 1.
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of realising a more swift ratification process is also obvious in the case of
the Kosovo SAA. Where the time between signature and entry into force
of the other SAAs ranged between 3 and 8 years,63 the Kosovo SAA en-
tered into force six months following its signature.64
In short, the suggested ways of addressing the issue of facultative mixi-
ty range from the practical (focus on advantages of EU-only agree-
ments),65 over the political (the Commission should build trust) to the le-
gal (the Court should step in). From a constitutional point of view, Eeck-
hout’s suggestion, being tied to the principle of sincere cooperation, stands
out as the most relevant avenue to explore.66 Even if the practical and the
political route may yield results, recourse to mixity would still be a purely
political choice: Member States may be swayed by practical or political
reasons to agree to make full use of the EU’s shared competences (and
thus to conclude an EU-only agreement) but they would not be legally
prevented from insisting on mixity.
Constitutional Limits to Facultative Mixity
Given its non-obligatory nature, more ways ought to exist to limit faculta-
tive compared to compulsory mixity. One of the potential avenues has of
course already been explored above: fully applying the absorption doctrine
V.
63 The Serbia SAA was signed on 29/04/2008 and entered into force on 01/09/2013;
the Bosnia and Herzegovina SAA was signed on 16/06/2008 and entered into
force 01/06/2015; the Montenegro SAA was signed on 15/10/2007 and entered in-
to force on 01/05/2010.
64 To be precise, the Kosovo SAA was signed on 01/10/2015 and entered into force
on 01/04/2016.
65 It should be noted that Timmermans’ argument could transcend the ‘purely’ practi-
cal and take on legal qualities. As Timmermans explains, the earlier case law of
the Court (notably Opinion 1/76 and Ruling 1/78) could be read as confirming
EU-only agreements as the default category of EU external action, resulting in a
specific justification requirement for concluding a facultative mixed agreement.
Yet, “this line of case law has not been further developed. As from Opinion 2/91,
full emphasis falls on the quest for exclusivity”. See C. Timmermans, supra note
58, 663-664. See also R. Schütze, supra note 5, 203-204.
66 This is not to say that it is the only relevant avenue to explore. Arguably, the role
played by the Commission in the ‘Community Method’ also has a constitutional
dimension but it is doubtful whether any clear limits or constraints could be de-
duced from it.
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may result in ancillary provisions of an agreement that come under a
shared EU competence being absorbed by the main provisions of that
agreement. If the latter come under an exclusive EU competence, as with,
for instance, the Free Trade Agreement with Korea,67 the question as to
the level (EU or Member State) at which competences will be exercised,
does not arise and the agreement will be an EU-only one.68
To explore further legal routes to limit recourse to facultative mixity,
the different approaches of a number of Advocate Generals may again be
juxtaposed. In addition to the Court’s ruling in US Air Transport Agree-
ment, the Opinions of Advocates General Sharpston, Wahl and Kokott al-
ready referred to above will assist us in our quest to identify a constitu-
tional limit to mixity.
Facultative Mixity as a Political Choice
Undoubtedly Advocate General Sharpston has put forward the most con-
servative or traditional understanding of the ‘triggering’ of mixity in her
Opinion on the EUSFTA.69 Before coming to the questions posed by the
Commission in this procedure, the Advocate General sets out the Lisbon
A.
67 The agreement with Korea was concluded at the time as a mixed agreement be-
cause of the Protocol on cultural cooperation. See the Protocol on Cultural Coop-
eration, OJ 2011, L 127/1418. However, the greatest part of this protocol does not
impose clear obligations on either of the parties. The only such obligations may be
found in Article 5(4-5) of the Protocol which entitles co-produced audiovisual
works of both parties to benefit from the other party’s promotion schemes. It could
have been argued that these provisions do not justify recourse to a mixed agree-
ment and should have been absorbed by the agreement’s main aim. However, fol-
lowing Opinion 2/15 a further argument for the (compulsory) mixity of the agree-
ment may be found in the FTA’s provisions on portfolio investment. Rather ques-
tionably, the Court in Opinion 2/15 found that a Treaty provision such as Article
63 TFEU cannot be affected in the ERTA sense and as a result, the provisions on
portfolio investments came under a shared competence and could not be approved
by the EU alone. See Opinion of 16 May 2017, 2/15, supra note 14, paras
233-244.
68 In the 1990s, Gilsdorf indeed criticised the tendency to conclude “trade and”
agreements to justify mixity even if the non-trade provisions could be easily ab-
sorbed by the dominant trade provisions. See P. Gilsdorf, supra note 33, 162.
69 The Commission’s observations in Opinion 2/92 exemplify how deeply en-
trenched this view is, even in the most supranationally oriented circles: discussing
the competence for the EU’s participation in the OECD’s decision, the Commis-
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framework on the existence and exercise of EU external competences.
Discussing the situation in which there is no a priori or supervening ex-
clusivity (under Article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2, TFEU) she notes that an EU
external competence will only exist (abstraction made of the EU’s sup-
porting competences) when a shared competence under Article 4 TFEU
can be linked to one of the cases described in Article 216, paragraph 1,
TFEU. As to the exercise of such an external competence, the Advocate
General remarks that the EU has a right of pre-emption but “[i]f the Euro-
pean Union does not choose to exercise that right, external competence —
like internal competence — will remain with the Member States and it fol-
lows that they (and not the European Union) will be competent to negoti-
ate, sign and conclude an international agreement whose subject matter
falls within that area of shared competence”.70
Remarkably, Advocate General Sharpston then proceeded to qualify the
EU legislature’s discretion in exercising its competences externally, find-
ing that the EU could not simply “assert external competence over any
area of shared competence listed in Article 4 irrespective of whether it has
chosen to exercise that right internally”.71 The reasoning behind this asser-
tion by the Advocate General is unclear72 but upholding it would impose a
limit on autonomous EU external action. It is, furthermore, at odds with
sion advocated an application of the ERTA and Opinion 1/76 doctrines and further
considered that “the Community legislature would have a discretion either to as-
sume all the obligations arising within the framework of the OECD or to leave the
Member States some latitude in matters not covered by Community legislation”.
See Opinion of 24 March 1995, 2/92, supra note 51, EU:C:1995:83, para 29.
70 Opinion of AG Sharpston of 21 December 2016, Opinion 2/15, supra note 38,
para 73.
71 Id., para 74.
72 Perhaps the confusion that a shared EU competence can only be exercised exter-
nally when it has already been exercised internally can be traced back to Opinion
1/94 in which the Court noted (as regards the competence to conclude the TRIPs):
“The Community is certainly competent to harmonize national rules on those mat-
ters, … But the fact remains that the Community institutions have not hitherto ex-
ercised their powers in the field of the 'enforcement of intellectual property rights'
…. It follows that the Community and its Member States are jointly competent to
conclude TRIPs”. See Opinion of 15 November 1994, 1/94, supra note 25, paras
104-105. However, as was remarked by commentators at the time, the Court in
that Opinion “did not explicitly answer the first question put to it by the Commis-
sion. That was to know whether the Community had, as such, the competence to
conclude all parts of the WTO Agreement relating to GATS and TRIPS”. See Edi-
torial Comments, “The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or How to Ensure Unity of
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the Council’s argument that the decision on who exercises shared compe-
tences (the EU or the Member States) is a political choice, even though the
Advocate General confirmed this argument in the very same paragraph.73
While this political choice typically falls in favour of the Member
States rather than the EU, it could in principle fall either way. According
to the Advocate General, the detailed procedure of Article 218 TFEU,
which is dominated by the Council, contains “the legal safeguards under-
pinning that political choice”.74 Thus, the Advocate General concludes
that, for agreements covering areas of shared competences, “the Member
States together (acting in their capacity as members of the Council) have
the power to agree that the European Union shall act or to insist that they
will continue to exercise individual external competence”.75
Following Advocate General Sharpston’s reasoning, the Member States
have an unfettered choice to make use or not of the EU’s shared compe-
tences and the procedure under Article 218 TFEU is even read as a safe-
guard guaranteeing the political nature of that choice. Furthermore, the on-
ly limit to this political choice which can be read in Advocate General
Sharpston’s analysis is a limit favouring mixity, since she sees the EU
barred from simply asserting its external competences if the EU has not
first exercised its competences internally.
Representation for Joint Competences”, Common Market Law Review 32, no. 2
(1995), 386. As a result, the Court concluded there was to be joint competence be-
cause it had already taken into account the fact that the Member States were not
willing to let the EU exercise its competences to the fullest.
73 At face value, the AG’s assertion also conflicts with the doctrine resulting from
Opinion 1/76 (codified by the Lisbon Treaty in Article 216, paragraph 1, TFEU) as
well as with the Court’s finding in Opinion 2/91 in which it noted that the EU “en-
joys an internal legislative competence in the area of social policy. Consequently,
Convention No 170 … falls within the Community’s area of competence”. See
Opinion of 19 March 1993, 2/91, Convention no. 170 of the International Labour
Organization concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work, EU:C:1993:106,
para 17.
74 Opinion of AG Sharpston of 21 December 2016, Opinion 2/15, supra note 3,
para 74.
75 Id., para 75 (emphasis in original).
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Limits Flowing from Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties
The analysis of Advocate General Wahl in the Opinion procedure on the
Marrakesh Treaty stands in stark contrast to that of Advocate General
Sharpston. After having determined the existence of EU competence and
proposing Articles 19 and 207 TFEU as the joint legal basis for the deci-
sion concluding the Marrakesh Treaty, Advocate General Wahl elaborated
on the nature of the EU’s competence. Apparently, the Hungarian govern-
ment argued that if the agreement came under shared competences it ought
to be concluded as a mixed agreement.76 The Advocate General rightly re-
futed this,77 noting that even if Article 3, paragraph 2, TFEU were not ap-
plicable, this would not inevitably call for mixity. Instead, “The choice be-
tween a mixed agreement or an EU-only agreement, when the subject mat-
ter of the agreement falls within an area of shared competence (or of paral-
lel competence), is generally a matter for the discretion of the EU legisla-
ture”.78 Advocate General Wahl thus confirmed the political nature of this
decision, following the traditional understanding of facultative mixity. The
novelty in the Advocate General’s reasoning resides in what follows, since
he argued that the decision is only predominantly, rather than wholly, po-
litical in nature and therefore subject to, albeit limited, judicial review.
Qualifying this judicial review, the Advocate General clearly proposed to
apply the Court’s general marginal review test: “the legality of a measure
adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institu-
tion is seeking to pursue”.79 Expounding on when the choice for mixity in
cases of facultative mixity would be manifestly inappropriate, the Advo-
cate General identified at least two scenario. Recourse to mixity would
thus be illegal if the agreement was concluded to tackle an urgent, press-
ing, issue. In such a case, having to wait for 29 ratification procedures to
B.
76 Opinion of AG Wahl of 8 September 2016, Opinion 3/15, supra note 23, para 119.
See also supra notes 12 and 29.
77 The Court later did so as well in Germany v Council, see Judgment of 5 December
2017, supra note 15.
78 Opinion of AG Wahl, supra note 23, para 119.
79 Id., para 120. On this standard of review in general, see P. Gilliaux, “L’intensité du
contrôle de la légalité par les juridictions communautaires”, Journal de droit eu-
ropéen 17, no. 156 (2009), 43.
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be completed might take so much time that realizing the agreement’s ob-
jective would be put in jeopardy. Secondly, the same length of time might
in some cases result in a breach by the EU of the principle of pacta sunt
servanda.
The fact that the Advocate General ties these two scenarios to the set-
tled case law of the Court on marginal review may indicate that those sce-
narios are just two illustrations from an open-ended list. Still even these
two illustrations raise a number of questions. Firstly, the reliance on the
principle of pacta sunt servanda may appear premature, since under Arti-
cle 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) the prin-
ciple only applies to treaties that have entered into force.80 However, the
problem identified by the AG is precisely that the entry into force would
be forthcoming because of the cumbersome ratification procedures. In-
stead, the Advocate General seems to have had Article 18 VCLT in
mind.81 Pursuant to Article 18(a) VCLT, a party “is obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has
signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty sub-
ject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its in-
tention clear not to become a party to the treaty”. The threshold required is
therefore rather high, as the party’s conduct should effectively defeat the
object and purpose of the agreement.82 More fundamentally, it appears that
the first scenario (referring to the objective of the treaty) identified by Ad-
vocate General Wahl may therefore be subsumed under the second sce-
nario, begging the question whether this is in fact the main (or only) sce-
nario in which the standard for showing a manifest error of assessment
would be met.
Regardless of these open questions, which the Advocate General did
not elaborate upon and which the Court did not have to deal with either
since it found, like the Advocate General, that the EU had exclusive com-
petence, Advocate General Wahl undoubtedly suggested a legal check on
80 See A. Austen, “Pacta Sunt Servanda”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public In-
ternational Law.
81 Confirming that Article 18 VCLT is binding on the EU, see Judgment of 22 Jan-
uary 1997, Opel Austria v Council, T-115/94, EU:T:1997:3, para 90.
82 See P. Palchetti, “Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention: A Vague and Ineffec-
tive Obligation or a UsefulMeans for Strengthening Legal Cooperation?”, in E.
Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2011), 27-28.
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the ‘political choice’ for facultative mixity. It should nevertheless be noted
that the limit suggested by Advocate General Wahl finds its origin in inter-
national public law rather than in EU constitutional law itself. In this re-
gard, this legal route is fundamentally different from Eeckhout’s sugges-
tion which relies on EU law.
Limits Flowing from the Union Interest and Unity in the EU’s
International Representation
Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion on Vietnam’s accession to the
WTO made a number of interesting observations, which could amount to
another constitutional limit on mixity. The questions at issue in this case
were whether the Council decision agreeing to Vietnam’s accession to the
WTO should have been adopted based only on Article 133, paragraphs 1
and 5, EC as proposed by the Commission and whether Article 133, para-
graph 5, EC (like Article 133, paragraph 1, EC) came under the EU’s ex-
clusive competence as the Commission claimed. The Advocate General
was sympathetic to the practical argument observing that “exclusive com-
petence for the Community in the field of trade in services and the com-
mercial aspects of intellectual property would be better suited for ensuring
the effective representation of European interests at international level”83
but ultimately found differently and noted, together with the Council, that
under the Nice Treaty there was neither a priori nor supervening exclusivi-
ty for trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property.
Following the traditional approach, the conclusion would be that the
Member States in the Council are free to decide whether the EU or the
Member States will exercise their shared powers. Here, the Advocate Gen-
eral disagreed, noting that “contrary to the view taken by the Council, it
does not necessarily follow, from the mere fact that Article 133(5) EC
does not provide for exclusive Community competence, that the Member
States were automatically entitled to be involved alongside the Communi-
ty in adopting the decision on Vietnam’s accession to the WTO”.84 Ac-
cording to the Advocate General, the reason for this lay in the concurrent
rather than parallel nature of the EU’s trade competence and also in a prac-
C.
83 Opinion of AG Kokott of 26 March 2009, Commission v Council, C-13/07,
EU:C:2009:190, para 63.
84 Id., para 66.
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tical argument since mixed action would make it more difficult “to repre-
sent effectively the interests of the Community and its Member States out-
wardly”.85 Here, the Advocate General was careful to limit her finding to
the EU’s trade policy: “Agreements to which the Member States as well as
the Community are parties are consequently out of place in the common
commercial policy. They should be permitted only where the Community
on its own has no or insufficient power and therefore has to rely on the
involvement of its Member States at international level”. Yet, it should be
clear that the practical argument regarding the ‘effective outward repre-
sentation of the EU and the Member States’ interests’ cannot a priori be
limited to the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP).86
A further question, which is raised by the Advocate General’s proposi-
tion is whether invoking the effective representation of the EU’s interests
is a purely practical argument or whether it may somehow be juridified.87
In this regard it may be noted that the Court relied on the idea of Union
(Community) interest in Opinion 1/75 in order to establish an exclusive
EU competence 88 and in Hermes and Dior 89 in order to establish its juris-
diction to interpret mixed agreements. According to Cremona, the legal
notion of Union interest finds its basis in Article 4, paragraph 3 of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and functions as a bridge between the
principle of primacy and the duty of cooperation. Thus, primacy puts sub-
stantive limits on the Member States’ competences, while the duty of co-
85 Id., para 72. For further practical reasons, see id., para 73.
86 Purely practically, the CCP might be a unique case, but from a legal perspective
the real distinction would seem to lie in whether the EU exercises a shared or par-
allel competence, as also noted by AG Kokott. under parallel competences, Mem-
ber States would retain a right to act.
87 According to Ortino, the meta-principle of effectiveness underlies and informs
most of the EU’s general principles, including the principle of sincere cooperation.
See M. Ortino, “A Reading of the EU Constitutional Legal System through the
Meta-Principle of Effectiveness”, Cahiers de droit européen 52, no. 1 (2016),
94-95.
88 Opinion of 11 November 1975, 1/75, EU:C:1975:145.
89 Judgment of 16 June 1998, Hermès, C-53/96, EU:C:1998:292; Judgment of
14 December 2000, Parfums Christian Dior, Joined Cases C-300/98 & C-392/98,
EU:C:2000:688. For a discussion, see P. Koutrakos, “Interpretation of Mixed
Agreements”, in C. Hillion, P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited,
supra note 3, 118-123.
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operation imposes procedural requirements on the Member States.90 As
the PFOS case has shown,91 these procedural requirements may amount to
a duty for the Member States to remain silent in international fora. Al-
though PFOS has been criticised for blurring the boundary between exclu-
sive and shared EU competences (imposing a duty to abstain on Member
States in both cases),92 it could form a springboard for further developing
the duty of cooperation. In essence, in PFOS, Sweden could not exercise
its shared competence because of the existence of a Union position. Simi-
larly, Advocate General Kokott proposed that Member States ought to re-
frain from exercising their shared competence, thereby leaving the legal
space to the EU. As noted above in relation to Eeckhout’s suggestion, the
qualitative difference between the two scenarios would lie in the fact that
PFOS was about exercising shared competence in the framework of a
mixed agreement, whereas further pursuing AG Kokott’s suggestion
would result in preventing the conclusion of a mixed act in the first place.
The duty of cooperation would thus take (another) qualitative leap since
its traditional function is to ensure the manageability of mixed agreements.
As the Court explained in Opinion 1/08: “The requirement of unity in the
international representation of the Community calls in addition for close
cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions
in the process of negotiation and conclusion of [mixed] agreements”.93 A
further development of the duty as sketched out above would take on a
new function, since it would simply pre-empt mixity. In a reasoning that
may be squared with Eeckhout’s suggestion, the requirement of unity in
the international representation of the Union would call for close coopera-
tion whereby Member States are required to cooperate solely within the
EU framework. Put differently, the qualitative leap would result in a (new)
90 M. Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and
Compliance”, in M. Cremona, B. de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Con-
stitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart, 2008), 126-127.
91 Judgment of 20 April 2010, Commission v Sweden, C-246/07, EU:C:2010:203.
92 A. Delgado Casteleiro, J. Larik, “The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in
EU External Relations?”, European Law Review 36, no. 4 (2011), 539.
93 Opinion of 30 November 2009, 1/08, General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) – Schedules of Specific Commitments Concerning Market Access and
Granting of National Treatment, EU:C:2009:739, para 136.
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positive obligation -the obligation to act solely through the EU- rather than
a simple negative obligation.94
Before such a positive obligation is put forward, a number of objections
would have to be addressed. Firstly such a new obligation would immedi-
ately have to be qualified as it would otherwise result in a duty to resort to
EU-only agreements in areas of shared (non-parallel) competences. This
would be difficult to square with Article 2, paragraph 2, TFEU unless it is
assumed that the latter does not apply to the EU’s external relations.95
However, Advocate General Kokott’s attempt to distinguish the CCP and
other EU policies shows how cumbersome it may be to show in practice
how the EU interest (in a specific case) requires an EU-only agreement.
Kokott herself juxtaposed the area of international trade with the area of
international development cooperation. Supposedly, the effectiveness of
the latter is not hampered if both the EU and its 28 Member States act con-
currently. In addition, the Advocate General warned of the risk that indi-
vidual Member States would (ab)use ‘reinforced unanimity’ in order to se-
cure individual concessions, and that third countries might pressure indi-
vidual EU Member States to acquire concessions from the EU as a whole.
The latter situation may prove to be a slippery slope, since it applies in a
lot of cases and cannot a priori be restricted to the area of the EU’s CCP.96
In any event, it would seem that, if contested before the Court, the Coun-
cil’s decision on whether to proceed with a mixed or an EU-only agree-
ment can be subject to only marginal review by the Court, in line with the
suggestions of Advocate General Wahl in his Opinion on the Marrakesh
Treaty. A second objection would be that the Court has imposed the duty
94 In this regard, Neframi has noted: “the unity of external representation is an objec-
tive stemming from the obligation to assert the EU identity on the international
sphere and falls under the loyalty obligation to abstain from any measure that
could jeopardize its attainment. The negative obligation is indeed liable to concili-
ate the requirement of unity with the maintenance of national sovereignty and indi-
vidual international action”. See E. Neframi, “ The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its
Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External Relations”, Common
Market Law Review 47, no. 2 (2010), 355.
95 Since Article 2, paragraph 2, TFEU is formulated without any reservations it may
be assumed that it applies generally. See also C. Timmermans, supra note 58, 661,
see footnote 6.
96 A possibility here could be to introduce a presumption in favour of EU-only agree-
ments, which the EU institutions and the Member States can rebut by demonstrat-
ing how the EU interest is not negatively affected by the conclusion of a mixed
(rather than EU-only) agreement.
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of cooperation to make mixity manageable, not to do away with it. Specif-
ically, the Court has developed the duty of (close) cooperation to counter
the Commission’s argument that the implementation of mixed agreements
would pose practical problems, finding that such problems “cannot modify
the answer to the question of competence”.97 A counter-argument here
would be that only the exercise, but not the existence, of Member States’
competences would be affected.98
Limits Flowing from the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order and the
Institutional Balance
A final constitutional check on the choice for facultative mixity may be
identified in the recent US Air Transport Agreement case. This case could
be read as confirming the idea that upholding the EU’s autonomy and the
institutional balance required by the Treaties constrains the EU institutions
and the Member States in their recourse to ‘mixed’ solutions. The condi-
tional tense is important here since the Commission in casu did not chal-
lenge the mixed nature of the agreement itself,99 only the Council’s deci-
sion to adopt a single hybrid act (together with the Member States) on the
provisional application (by both the EU and the Member States) of a
mixed agreement.
In essence, the Commission’s argument boiled down to the proposition
that hybrid decisions are not foreseen under the Treaties and should there-
fore not be tolerated. Presented in such a way, the Commission’s case
looked rather problematic, since the agreement to which the contested de-
D.
97 Opinion of 15 November 1994, 1/94, supra note 25, para 107; Opinion of 6 De-
cember 2001, 2/00, supra note 21, para 41; Opinion of 30 November 2009, 1/08,
supra note 93, para 127.
98 In turn, an obvious criticism here would be that the distinction between the exis-
tence (unaffected) and exercise (affected) of a competence is purely theoretical. If
a competence does not come with the concomitant power it is null. See V. Con-
stantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés européennes: contri-
bution à l'étude de la nature juridique des communautés (Paris: Librairie Générale
de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1974), 82-83.
99 See Opinion of AG Mengozzi of 29 January 2015, Commission v Council,
C-28/12, EU:C:2015:43, para 38; Judgment of 28 April 2015, Commission v
Council, C-28/12, EU:C:2015:282, para 46.
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cision related was a mixed agreement and therefore a hybrid itself.100 Be-
fore the Court, the Council also tried to bring this point home by arguing
that the use of a hybrid act co-authored by the Member States “is entirely
consistent with the mixed nature of the underlying agreements and with
the fact that the Member States are in certain respects exercising their own
competences. It is a permissible consequence of concluding mixed agree-
ments with which it is in legal symmetry”.101 Tying its argument to the
principle of sincere cooperation the Council also argued that the use of hy-
brid decisions is an expression of close cooperation between the EU and
the Member States and of the requirement of unity in the EU’s external
representation.102
The Council’s argument was not without merit. After all, if the Court of
Justice has found that the EU’s constitutional charter tolerates facultative
mixed agreements, why would it be opposed to the logical consequence of
mixity in an internal EU act? The key to understanding the Court’s ruling
is provided by the Court itself in the opening statements to its findings,
where it reminds us of its Van Gend & Loos ruling: “the founding treaties
of the European Union, unlike ordinary international treaties, established a
new legal order”.103 Rules from the international (or national) legal or-
der(s) cannot simply be transposed to the new EU legal order since it is
autonomous. This helps in understanding the error in the Council’s argu-
ment: a mixed agreement may indeed be hybrid, but comes into being,
thrives and perishes in the international legal order; the contested hybrid
decision however was an act internal to the autonomous EU legal order.104
100 See also T. Verellen, “On Hybrid Decisions, Mixed Agreements and the Limits of
the New Legal Order: Commission v Council (“US Air Transport Agreement”)”,
Common Market Law Review 53, no. 3 (2016), 742.
101 Opinion of AG Mengozzi of 29 January 2015, supra note 99, para 28.
102 Id., para 29.
103 Judgment of 28 April 2015, Commission v Council, supra note 99, para 39.
104 While the question of provisional application of international agreements is also
governed by international law, notably Article 25 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, it is in essence a question of domestic law. As Lefeber notes
“Treaty limits to provisional application will often result from the limited powers
of the representatives of the negotiating States to agree to the provisional applica-
tion of a treaty. The powers of the competent organ, usually the government, to
agree to a treaty on a provisional basis may be limited by national law”. See R.
Lefeber, “Treaties, Provisional Application”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, May 2011, para 14.
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The logic or permissibility (as referred to by the Council) of pursuing “hy-
bridity” fails when one moves from the international to the EU legal order.
Crucially, it should be noted that the Court never expressed a view on
whether hybrid decisions as such are tolerated in the EU legal order. In-
stead the Court referred to Article 218 TFEU and Article 13, paragraph 2,
TEU, implying it is not really concerned with the hybrid nature of a deci-
sion but that it is instead simply interested in ensuring that whatever the
EU institutions do, the “procedures, conditions and objectives” set out in
the Treaties are respected.105 This had not been the case since the contest-
ed decision was an act of both the Council and the Member States, while
Article 218, paragraph 5, TFEU stipulates that only the Council may de-
cide on the provisional application of an agreement. Second, a single pro-
cedure had been used to adopt, in essence, two distinct decisions, which
are subject to two incompatible decision-making procedures. The Court
concluded from this that Article 218, paragraph 8, TFEU had necessarily
been infringed.
As noted, the mixed nature of the agreement itself was not at issue in
US Air Transport Agreement and opinions diverge as to whether the
Court’s ruling will hamper the management of mixed agreements in prac-
tice.106 If it does, the ruling might make recourse to (facultative) mixed
agreements less attractive and might thereby indirectly limit mixity. More
important for our present enquiry is whether a party, such as the Commis-
sion, could rely on similar reasoning in order to challenge the decision to
conclude a facultative mixed agreement rather than an EU-only agreement
itself. Does the choice for inter-governmental action in cases where EU
action is possible undermine the autonomy of EU law, specifically by un-
dermining the prerogatives of the EU institutions (and hence institutional
balance)?107 In a different context, the Court did not support such a rea-
105 Of course, it could be argued that hybrid decisions per se infringe these “proce-
dures, conditions and objectives” but the Court did not (have to) express a view
on this point.
106 Compare the evaluation by T. Verellen, supra note 100, and A. P. van der Mei,
“EU External Relations and Internal Inter-Institutional Conflicts – The Battlefield
of Article 218 TFEU”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
23, no. 6 (2016), 1056.
107 A further illustration may be seen in the Opinion of AG Wathelet in Commission
v Council. The Council and Member States had referred to previous practice in
relation to transport agreements to justify the presence of detailed procedural
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soning in the Pringle case108 but the argument may be revived in the light
of US Air Transport Agreement and the general rise of inter-governmental
decision-making in the (broader) EU-context.109 Although not expressly
writing in terms of the EU’s autonomy or its institutional balance, in the
1990’s Gilsdorf also observed that the Treaty provisions on the negotia-
tion, conclusion and binding effect of agreements concluded by the EU are
not only frustrated but also undermined by the involvement of Member
States in their capacity as sovereign States.110 Especially when bilateral
agreements are at issue,111 facultative mixity may upset the EU’s institu-
tional balance because it complicates the EU institutions’ decision-making
obligations in the Council’s negotiating directives (adopted pursuant to Article
218, paragraph 4, TFEU) for an agreement with Australia. The AG stressed that
the latter was to be concluded as an EU-only agreement whereas the earlier
agreements had been mixed and consequently found that prior practice to be ir-
relevant. See Opinion of AG Wathelet of 17 March 2015, Commission v Council,
C-425/13, EU:C:2015:174, para 152. The institutional balance argument for lim-
iting mixity is clear here: if a qualitative difference between negotiating direc-
tives for mixed and EU-only agreements is accepted whereby the Commission is
more restrained when it negotiates mixed agreements, the Council could be un-
dermining the institutional balance when it insists on negotiating an envisaged
agreement as a (facultative) mixed agreement rather than as an EU-only agree-
ment.
108 See Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, paras
67-68.
109 In relation to this, see the rise of the so called Union method used for addressing
the eurocrisis (ESM, Fiscal Compact), the banking crisis (IGA), the unitary
patent package (unified patent court), the migration crisis (EU-Turkey statement),
etc. See J-V. Louis, “Les réponses à la crise”, Cahiers de droit européen 47, no.
2 (2011), 355-356; Editorial Comments, Common Market Law Review 51, no. 1
(2014), 9; Editorial Comments, Common Market Law Review 54, no. 3 (2017),
689. On the new Union method in general, see T. Eijsbouts, J-H. Reestman, “Edi-
torial: In search of the Union Method”, European Constitutional Law Review 11,
no. 3 (2015), 425-433.
110 P. Gilsdorf, supra note 33, 162.
111 Gilsdorf especially takes issue with bilateral (rather) than multilateral mixed
agreements. This is because, as Van der Loo and Wessel explain “In the case of
bilateral agreements, the EU and its Member States are presented as one party de-
spite the need for all of them to sign and ratify the agreement […] In the case of
multilateral mixed agreements, the EU and its Member States are more clearly
parties in their own right”. See G. Van der Loo, R. Wessel, “The Non-Ratification
of Mixed Agreements: Legal Consequences and Solutions”, Common Market
Law Review 54, no. 3 (2017), 736.
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aspired by the Treaties, exposing it in an accentuated manner to the do-
mestic policies of every single Member State.112
Conclusion
The traditional and among practitioners still prevailing view is that the
choice for mixity (in so far as mixity is not legally required) is a purely
political one: Member States may and will insist on being involved as par-
ties to the agreement whenever the agreement is not wholly covered by
EU exclusive competences. That approach significantly hampers the EU
in its external action, which begs the question whether the political choice
for (facultative) mixity should not somehow be legally qualified and, if so,
how this could be done, without imposing EU exclusivity. A number of
suggestions to this end, drawing on EU constitutional and international
law, made by both academics and Advocates General have been explored
in this contribution. While some appear more promising (and legally
sound) than others, the Court has yet to follow up on any of them.
To limit mixity, the Court could further clarify its absorption doctrine or
rely on the international law principle of good faith. It could also further
develop its established case law on the duty of cooperation to include a
duty for the Member States to abstain from exercising their competences
as fully-fledged subjects of international law in areas of shared compe-
tences. Alternatively the Court could derive such a duty from the require-
ment to uphold the autonomy of the EU legal order and to safeguard insti-
tutional balance. Although this could not be discussed in the present con-
tribution, the case for the Court to do so only seems to be strengthened by
a new surge of inter-governmentalism in the guise of the Union method
that has begun to take hold of EU integration in recent years.
As has also been noted however, developing these constitutional (or
other) limits to mixity cannot result in a wholesale ban on facultative mix-
ity. Developing such legal limits therefore entails both clarifying the stan-
dard against which the Court may test the choice for mixity and determin-
ing the appropriate degree of judicial review.
VI.
112 P. Gilsdorf, supra note 33, 163.
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